What happens if mubarak leaves

And in the analyses to come, al-Jazeera's role will require a chapter of its own This did not come out of nowhere — Egyptian activists have been mobilizing for change for a decade, with the Kefaya movement deserving enormous credit for breaking the walls of silence and fear and bringing opposition to the Mubarak regime out into the public sphere.

But their success in the face of the power of a strong authoritarian regime was a surprise to everyone — including to them. It understood immediately and intuitively that it should not attempt to lead a protest movement which had mobilized itself without American guidance, and consistently deferred to the Egyptian people.

Despite the avalanche of criticism from protestors and pundits, in fact Obama and his key aides — including Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power and many others — backed the Egyptian protest movement far more quickly than anyone should have expected. Their steadily mounting pressure on the Mubarak regime took time to succeed, causing enormous heartburn along the way, but now can claim vindication. By working carefully and closely with the Egyptian military, it helped restrain the worst violence and prevent Tiananmen on the Tahrir — which, it is easy to forget today, could very easily have happened.

No bombs, no shock and awe, no soaring declarations of American exceptionalism, and no taking credit for a tidal wave which was entirely of the making of the Egyptian people — just the steadily mounting public and private pressure on the top of the regime which was necessary for the protestors to succeed.

The Obama administration also understood from the start, and has consistently said, that removing Mubarak would not be enough. It has rejected "faux democracy," and pushed hard for fundamental systemic reforms.

Over the coming days and weeks, it should push for specific changes on a clear timetable: lifting the emergency reform, amending the Constitution, appointing a credible and nonpartisan commission to oversee elections, securing a guarantee from whoever acts as the interim head of state that he will not run for re-election, preventing retaliation against protestors, ensuring the inclusion of opposition figures in the process, and more.

I hope that everyone thrilled by the downfall of the dictator remains attentive and committed to helping bring about the democratic transformation which Egyptians deserve, which serves real American interests, and which could help change the entire region.

Perhaps this should earn it some praise, and even some benefit of the doubt going forward. And now, a day to celebrate before rolling up the sleeves for the hard work to come. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He publishes frequently on the politics of the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Arab media and information technology, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Islamist movements. There are, however, some broad things than can be said about the Egyptian military.

There is no ONE military, and a careful distinction needs to be made between the real military that total around , personnel, and are under the Ministry of Defense. Others in uniform include the , personnel in the Central Security Services and 60, in National Guard, that are under the Ministry of the Interior.

These latter forces are the primary source of the oppression documented in the annual US State Department human rights report, and of the growing authoritarianism and abuses that Egyptians are now protesting. While the Egyptian military may well be the ultimate power brokers in a time of major political upheaval, they also are a military force and not-- as is the case in Algeria -- the de facto government. They do not dominate the economy or civil government, and most -- like other Egyptians -- have been subject to surveillance by Egypt's oppressive intelligence services.

These services themselves present real question about Egypt's future power structure. They also are as divided as the military security services. More broadly, the Egyptian military are not an isolated elite. They are a citizen army. Most actual soldiers are conscript and many junior officers are graduates who serve short tours or who join the military because it is the only job available.

Mid level officers are usually career professional that are not part of the political side of the military. They have won considerable public respect and support over the years, but they also have lost status as a new class of businessmen and profiteers has acquired great wealth and the disparities income have growth.

Most can now buy less by way of housing, education for the children, and the key elements of middle class living than in the past. Some do have every reason to be loyal to the status quo. There are significant numbers of retired senor military officers in Mubarak's inner circle who have been given sinecures and senior posts in the civil government and state industries, and who will want to continue to benefit from the regime.

But the bulk of even senior the officers who leave don't enjoy these privileges. Moreover, the Egyptian military are military is stove-piped by branch and service, and most senior officers are in career paths that do not give them have special access to to those who in Mubarak's close circle.

Those who do become part of Mubarak "loyalists"have acquired money and status, but further even senior officers are outside the circle, the more they rely on their military pay. These distinctions also help explain why most of military retain so much popular respect. It is also important to understand that democracy is less important to most Egyptians than material benefits, jobs, decent education, effective government services, ending corruption and favoritism, and emphasizing the concept of justice in ways that provide security and honest police and courts.

People aren't looking for a vote as much as they want to stop the economic, political and social injustice -- a search compounded by the fact Islam place so much emphasis on justice in every aspect of life and governance.

The loudest and most Western voices in the square do not always speak for the Egyptian people, and practical compromise with around programs that provide justice and benefits may be easier for both the military and the people than some realize.

At the same time, the military's top priority is to preserve the nation and maintain order and limit chaos or upheaval. They are far less likely to use torture or violence than the forces under Ministry of Interior as the entire command ethic of the professional military is the nation, not the leader, and military discipline puts real restraints on their actions.

However, there also are real limits to their tolerance. They will not accept a breakdown of the government or economy. They will not accept paralysis or demonstrations that become violent, although they will not support a new wave of repression.

Mohamed ElBaradei, who on Thursday called for a military takeover, described the change as the liberation of the Egyptian people.

Our priority to make sure the country is restored; socially cohesive, economically vibrant, politically democratic," he said. Make the best use of it. US president Barack Obama, who had supported Mubarak remaining in power until a stable transitional administration was in place, called on the new military leaders to take concrete steps towards democratic change. That means protecting the rights of Egypt's citizens, lifting the emergency law, revising the constitution and other laws to make this change irreversible, and laying out a clear path to elections that are fair and free," he said.

The US defence secretary, Robert Gates, has been in regular contact with Tantawi and spoke to him hours before the military takeover.

In Britain, David Cameron called on the new administration to ensure a move to civilian and democratic rule.

The EU foreign policy chief, Lady Ashton, said: "It is important now that the dialogue is accelerated leading to a broad-based government which will respect the aspirations of, and deliver stability for, the Egyptian people. Mubarak's resignation came after a turbulent 24 hours in which a televised address to the nation that was intended to defuse the crisis only further infuriated the protesters and prompted the largest demonstrations to date.

On Thursday evening, after a day in which members of the president's party and cabinet said they expected him to resign, Mubarak announced that he was handing his powers to Suleiman. That in effect left Mubarak as president in name only, a move he appears to have believed would be enough to satisfy the protesters' demands for his resignation. But on the streets of Cairo the announcement was interpreted as the regime's leaders shuffling authority among themselves, and the crisis deepened.

The army appears to have expected more from him, possibly including his complete resignation or the transfer of powers to the military, not Suleiman. Clearly alarmed at the popular reaction, it sought to reassure the protesters with a declaration that the promise of free elections would be fulfilled. But that too failed to ease the demonstrations, as many in the opposition saw the statement as backing the status quo, although it could also be read as offering an assurance to Egyptians that the military was prepared to ensure Mubarak stood by his commitments.